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NoTEs AND Comrs
being traditionally the province of the jury It is believed, however,
that the Kentucky court is merely admitting a truth which in reality is
necessarily practiced by all courts, probably without their realization
of it. Deciding the question whether evidence is truly corroborative
or not is often an intricate task. Any court is bound to be influenced
by its own observation that the testimony of the accomplice himself
which is sought to be corroborated is stigmatized with suspicion, and
m a case where courts are skeptical, they are likely to be more de-
manding in their requirements of corroboration.
The Daggit case goes far in its protection of one who is accused
of crime by a person who claims to be his accomplice. It is believed,
however, that the reasons which led the courts and legislatures to adopt
the requirements of corroboration are still valid. The case may very
well become a leading one for corroboration at a time when the re-
quirement is being neglected in many jurisdictions.
JAmms DANEL Comux~rE
IRRIGATION IN KENTUCKY AS AFFECTED BY THE LAW OF
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
The beneficial use of irrigationi is not confined to the and and semi-
and western states. It has been very effective m the humid areas of
the eastern and southeastern states. Irrigation was very effective in
Kentucky this year, although it was used on a small acreage.
With the price of Kentucky farm land surpassing previous peaks,
farm commodities nearing record prices and farm labor being rapidly
absorbed by Kentucky s expanding industries and Federal sponsored
projects, the Kentucky farmer is being induced and forced into pur-
chasing more farm machinery and fertilizers, and using modern, eco-
nomical farming methods. After obtaining a high level of soil fertility
with such practices, he is confronted with the ageless problems of in-
sufficient moisture for maximum and efficient crop production. In Ken-
tucky, there were thirteen years in a twenty-year period studied in
"The Latin word 'irrgare from which the term 'irrigation is derived means,
pnmarily to convey water to or upon anything and, more generally, to wet or
moisten. In our language, the ordinary and popular conception of the term is that
it denotes the application of water to land for the production of crops. The mere
method of obtaining the water with which to irrigate has nothing to do with the
process of irrigation or with the meaning of the word; the term embraces all arti-
ficial watering of lands, whether by channels, by flooding, or merely by sprinlding."
30 Am. Jur. 598 (1940).
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which there was insufficient rainfall for good pasture growth. A long-
time estimate shows that only two out of every five years have enough
ram of normal distribution for a good crop yield.2
Tobacco, the acreage of which is controlled by Federal regulation,
is the principal cash crop in Kentucky During 1951 farmers who ir-
rigated this crop were able to double their yield and greatly improve
the quality in a year which was not considered a drought year for the
state. These farmers also increased the yields of other crops, including
pasture, by irrigation and thus prevented the necessity for the sale of
livestock before they were ready for market.
Under present economic conditions many Kentucky farmers would
have good reason to protect their farming investment by buying
portable irrigation systems to insure maximum crop yields and prevent
crop failures from local drought conditions. All evidence indicates that
irrigation will continue to develop in this state. This development un-
doubtedly will present substantial legal problems arising under the
law of riparian rights,3 a doctrine which the Kentucky courts have al-
ways followed. It is the purpose of this note to investigate these
problems and to suggest possible solutions to them.
The common law of riparian rights is based on the proposition that
all the owners of land along a natural watercourse have equal rights
with respect to the use4 and benefit of the water which flows by their
land. Each proprietor has rights of use which are co-equal to those
who own land above, below and adjacent to him; at the same time
'Data gathered from the U.S. Weather Bureau, Lexington, Kentucky, by Prof.
R. M. Thaxton of the Kentucky Agricultural Expenment Station, Agronomy De-
partment. Irrigation Studies on Pastures in Kentucky, February 17, 1951.
"Briefly, a riparian proprietor is one whose land is bounded or traversed by
a natural stream, and riparian rights are those which such a proprietor has to the
use of the stream or water." 56 Am. Jun. 726 (1947).
"In the early English Common Law there was little litigation over the private
use of water. The uses for water were limited mainly to use for domestic purposes
and for running small grist mills, and the law in respect to such uses was relatively
simple: 'First come, first served. Each landowner was regarded as having the
privileges of using the water on his land for his own ordinary purposes irrespective
of the effect on others, but this was not as harsh a rule as it might seem, for the
simple reason that such use seldom had any material effect on others. There was
water enough for all because there were no such things as public waterworks,
sewage disposal system, large factories and power plants.
"With the beginning of the industrial revolution, however, the situation
changed. There arose many new uses for water which either consumed large
quantities of it or polluted it to such an extent that it was of little use to others.
The resulting conflict of interest in the use of water demanded a more equitable
rule than 'first come, first served. Story and Kent with their knowledge of
Roman Law, seized upon the law of Riparian Rights and applied it to these new
and extraordinary uses. In brief, that theory of law embodied the principle that
all riparian proprietors on a watercourse or lake have equal rights in respect to
the use of the water, and that none can use to the extent of depriving others of
an equal opportunity to use." 4 RESTATEMfENT, Tonws 341 (1939).
NoTEs AND CommNTs 425
he has certain obligations and limitations upon the use of this water.
Tiffany sets out the basis of riparian rights in this way-
"In those jurisdictions in which the common law as to riparian owners
has not been abrograted or materially altered, the right of the owner
of ripanan land to the natural flow of water in a stream along the
land is a corporeal hereditament, incident and annexed to the land,
and which passes on transfer thereof as a part and parcel of it.
"Though the water of a natural water-course is not the subject of pn-
vate ownership, each riparian owner, has, by reason of the usufructary
title above referred to, certain rights, and is subject to certain obliga-
tions, in regard to the use thereof, which may be summarized in gen-
eral terms by the statement that, on the one hand, he is entitled to
have the water flow as it has been accustomed to flow, and, on the
other hand, since the other proprietors have the same right, he can-
not himself interfere with such flow to any material extent."5
Under the law of ripanan rights there are two theories6 as.to what
i3 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY 117 (3 ed. 1939). On page 120 he goes on to
say "The right of a riparian owner to appropriate water flowing past his land is,
in general, limited to its use for such purposes, to such an extent, and in such a
way as will not be inconsistent with a similar use by owners of other land lower
down the stream, lower riparian propnetors as they are usually called. His
right to appropriate the water for his domestic use, and also for the watering of
his cattle, is not, however, according to the great weight of authority, limited by
considerations of the necessities of lower proprietors, and he may use the water
for these ordinary purposes, even though the effect be to exhaust the supply. On
the other hand, us right to appropnate the water of the stream for what are con-
sidered extraordinary uses, such as manufacturing and irrigation, is restricted by
the reqmrement that such appropnation must not so diminsh the flow of water
as matenally to injure other proprietors lower down the stream, or, as the same
idea is otherwise expressed, his use of the water must not be unreasonable, having
regard to a like use by the lower proprietors."8
"The natural flow theory. Under tus theory the primary or fundamental
right of each npanan proprietor on a watercourse or lake is to have the body of
water maintained in its natural state, not sensibly dimimshed in quantity, or im-
paired in quality. Each proprietor, however, is recognized as having the pnvilege
to use the water to supply his natural' wants, and each also has a privilege to
make extraordinary or artificial uses so long, but only so long, as such uses do
not sensibly or materially affect the natural quantity or quality of the water, and
are made on or in connection with the use of the npanan land. These limited
privileges in each proprietor qualify the primary rights of the other proprietors to
have the stream or lake maintained in the status quo of nature. Thus, according
to this theory of riparian rights, all proprietors have equal rights to have the water
flow as it was wont to flow in the course of nature, qualified only by the equal
pnvileges in each to make limited uses of the water.
"The advantages of this theory are that it is relatively more definite and cer-
tain, and that each npanan proprietor knows what uses he can or cannot lawfully
make of the water. The disadvantages of the theory are that it is non-utilitarian
and prohibits many beneficial uses of water although those uses may be causing
no one any harm, and although the water would run to waste if not so used.
"The Reasonable Use Theory. Under the Reasonable Use theory the primary
or fundamental right of each npanan proprietor on a water-course or lake is
merely to be free from an unreasonable interference with his use of the water
therein. Emphasis is placed on a full and beneficial use of the advantages of the
stream or lake, and each riparian proprietor has a privilege to make a beneficial
use of water for any purpose, provided only that such use does not unreasonably
interfere with the beneficial use of others. Reasonable use is the only measure of
npanan rights. Reasonableness, being a question of fact, must be determined
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is meant by equal rights of use. In one, the natural flow theory, the
riparian owner has the privilege to supply all his natural wants. He
may even make use of the water in a way which is considerd extra-
ordinary or artificial insofar as it does not materially affect the quality
or quantity of the stream. The other theory is one of reasonable use, a
doctrine which may permit full and complete use of the water, the
only limitation being that such use shall not be unreasonable as it
affects other owners on the same stream. The Kentucky court, though
committed to the natural flow theory, has on occasion applied what
amounts to a reasonable use theory, and has said that the distinction
between the two is very close.7 An explanation of an additional classi-
fication used in connection with the reasonable use theory may be help-
ful. Generally, the riparian use of water has been considered as falling
into two categories: natural and artificial. The basis for this classifica-
tion is indicated by one court as follows:
"These rights of riparian owners have at all times been divided into
two classes, dependent upon the use to which the water is to be put,
which uses have been variously denominated ordinary or extra-
ordinary and natural' or artificial'. The so-called ordinary or natural
use includes the use of water for domestic purposes and for watenng
stock. The extra-ordinary or artificial use including manufacturing,
inming, and irrigation."' (sic.)
in each case on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. Reasonableness
is deterinmed from a standpoint of a court or jury and depends not only upon the
utility of the use itself, but also upon the gravity of its consequences on other
propnetors.
The advantages of tis theory are that it is entirely utilitarian and tends to
promote the fullest beneficial use of water resources. Furthermore, there are no
absolute or techical rights and a cause of action anses only when one propnetor s
use of water causes substantial harm to, and an unreasonable interference with,
another s use. One need not fear that another is acqtunng any prescnptive rights
against hun until hIs use has been actually mterferred with. The disadvantage
of the theory is its indefiniteness. Under it one cannot always be absolutely surejust what uses he can or cannot lawfully make of the water; and even though a
use may, in its inception, be reasonable, circumstances may change to such an
extent that it will become unreasonable." 4 RESTATEmENT, TORTS 843 et seq.
(1949).
'City of Louisville v. Tway, 297 Ky. 565, 180 S.W 2d 278 (1944).
'Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 26 S. D. 807, 128 N.W 596,
598 (1910). Though this is the general classification it has been criticized as a
needless distinction. Meng v. Coffey, 67 Neb. 500 at - 93 N.W 713 at 717(1903) says: "This subject has been confused needlessly by the unfortunate use
of the words natural" and ordinary in this connection to distinguish those uses
which the common law does not attempt to limit, and artificial' or extraordinary
to designate those which are required to be exercised within reasonable bounds.
It is no doubt true that irrigation is a very natural and very ordinary want, and
that use of a stream for such purpose is natural and ordinary in semiarid reg-
ions. But such is not the question. The law does not regard the needs and
desires of the person taking the water solely to the exclusion of all other ripanan
proprietors. The true distinction appears to lie behveen those modes of use
which ordinarily involve the taking of small quantities, and but little interference
with the stream, such as driking and other household purposes, and those which
necessarily involve the taking or diversion of large quantities and a considerable
interference with its ordinary course and flow such as manufacturing purposes."
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As this case goes on to point out,9 if the use is for natural purposes
such as watering stock or other domestic purposes the water may be
used to the extent of completely dimimishng it' ° without it being an
unreasonable use." Whereas in the case of artificial purposes, reason-
able use means that the use must not so diminish the supply that other
riparian owners are deprived of the benefit for their natural uses.
Even though the courts adhere generally to the two theories just
described, an analysis of the cases seems to indicate that there is no
substantial distinction in the privilege of use of water under the
natural flow theory and reasonable use theory when applied to irriga-
tion cases. It is well recognized that the use of water by riparian
owner for irrigation is one of the common law rights he has in the
water.i2 This right is not without limitation'13 however. The proprietor
cannot under this right wholly abstract or divert the course of the
water, nor is he allowed to use an amount which will injure other
proprietors by depriving them of the benefits which they would have
derived if it had not been so used.14 It is the general rule, nevertheless,
'Id. at - N.W at 598 Also see 56 Am. Jun. 782 (1947).
" Anderson v. Cincinnati Southern Railway, 86 Ky. 44, 49, 5 S.W 49, 51(1887) said m quoting Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15 Conn. 366 (1843) -"The prim-
ar, use of water is for natural and domestic purposes, and each propnetor of the
land through wich it flows may use as much of it as is necessary for those pur-
poses, even if it be entirely consumed in the use; but he is limited as regards other
purposes to a reasonable and proportionate use, which must not be such as to
exclude others from a benefit to which they are equally entitled with himself."
' In the use of water by a ripanan owner the question of reasonableness may
depend on the kind of use the water is extracted for. In the problem of irrigation
the question of amount is the salient consideration; however, it may be well to
remind the reader that amount is not the only basis for deternrnng reasonable-
ness. Pollution is one way m which one may use water unreasonably without
diminishing it in quantity. B. & B. Oil Co. v. Townsend, 301 Ky. 667, 192 S.W
2d 953 (1946); Greenbaum v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 723 (1889);
Hunter v. Taylor Coal Co., 16 Ky. Law Rep. 190 (1894).
'Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 26 S. D. 307, 128 N.W 596
(1910); Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 846 at - 80 P. 571 at 584 (1905) says:
"The authorities are unammous to the effect that the use of water for irrigation is
one of the common-law rights of a riparian proprietor (authority cited)." 4
SHEAIs iAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE 1849 footnote 13 (1941).
"Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253, 23 Am. Dec. 504 (1832); Meng v. Coffee,
67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W 713 (1903); Elliot v. Fitchburg R. Co., 10 Cush (Mass.)
191, 57 Am. Dec. 85 (1852); Jones v. Conn., 39 Or. 30, 64 P. 855 (1901).
L Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 864 at - 80 P. 571 at 584 (1905) cites the
case of Elliott v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 10 Cush. 191, 57 Am. Dec. 85 (1852)
vhich says: "That a portion of the water of a stream may be used for the purpose
of imgating land we think is well established as one of the rights of the proprietors
of the soil along or through which it passes. Yet a proprietor cannot, under color
of that right, or for the actual purpose of irrigating is own land, wholly abstract
or divert the water course, or take such an unreasonable quantity of water, or
make such unreasonable use of it, as to deprive other proprietors of the substantial
benefits which they nght derive from if it not diverted or used unreasonably.
Tis rule that no riparian proprietor can wholly abstract or divert a water course, by
which it would cease to be a running stream, or use it unreasonably in its passage,
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that merely diminishing' 5 the volume of water m the stream will not
give basis for damages.'0 The rule has been interpreted by some
riparian owners to mean that a riparian proprietor is entitled to have
the water of a stream flow through his premises without being subject
to any right of other riparian owners if the use of it m any way dis-
turbs the quantity and quality of the flow This is not a correct in-
terpretation of the law and the court in the case of Meng v. Coffey said:
"The common law seeks to secure equality in the use of the water
among all those who are so situated that they may use it. It does
not give any ripanan owner property in the corpus of the water,
either so as to be able to take all of it, or so as to insist that every
drop of it flow in its natural channel."
and thereby deprive a lower proprietor of a quality of his property, deemed, in
law, incidental and beneficial, necessarily flows from the principle that the right
to the reasonable and beneficial use of a running stream is common to all the
riparian proprietors, and so each is bound so to use his common nght as not
essentially to prevent or interfere with an equally beneficial enjoyment of the com-
mon right by all the proprietors. The nght to the use of flowing water is
publici juns and common to all the ripanan proprietors. It is not an absolute
and exclusive right to all the water flowing past their land, so that any obstruction
would give a cause of action; but it is a right to the flow and enjoyment of the
water, subject to a similar right in all the proprietors, to the reasonable enjoyment
of the same gift of Providence. It is therefore only for an abstraction and de-
privation of this common benefit, or for an unreasonable and unauthorized use
of it, that an action will lie."
'"Now, it is obvious, that there is scarcely any mode whatever, whether
artificial or not, by which water can be beneficially used, which would not be
necessarily attended with some degree of loss. It is not practicable for every
particle of it, which is not used or consumed, to be returned to the original stream.
It does not, however, necessarily follow, that in such cases there has been an im-
proper use of one s own rights, or an infringement of the rights of others. The
principles on this subject, as they are generally, and with substantial accuracy
stated in the books, that each proprietor through whose land the stream runs, is
entitled to its use, as it is wont to run (ut currere solebat) without diminution or
alteration; and, that the water cannot be diverted, in whole or part, but must be
returned, after it is used, to its ordinary channel-are not to be understood so
literally as to prevent that small, or unessential, or insensible diminution, variation
or loss of the water, which is necessarily consequent upon the beneficial and proper
enjoyment of it; for such a strictness of construction would be wholly incompatible
with the nature of the element, and most of the important purposes for which it
was created; and indeed, in most cases, would prevent its beneficial enjoyment at
all." Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15 Conn. 365 at 374 (1843).
6 "The mere fact that the riparian proprietor is deprived of the full flow of
the stream adjacent to his land would furmsh no basis for compensatory damages.
Merely diminmshing the volume of water m the stream would not deprive the
owner of property for which he could lay claim to a pecumary compensation. At
most, the naked right to the full flow of the stream, and its loss by diminishing the
volume of water when appropriated for irrigating purposes, could result only in
damnum absque injuna. In order to entitle the riparian owner to compensation,
he must suffer an actual loss or injury to the use of the water which the law
recognizes as belonging to hnm, and to deprive him of which is to take from him
a substantial property right. It is for an interference with or injury to his
usufructuary estate in the water for which compensation may rightfully be claimed
where the water of the stream is diverted and appropriated for the use of irnga-
tion. It is such a taking of or damage to property as materially and substantially
depreciates the value of the real estate of which it forms a part." Crawford Co. v.
Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, - 93 N.W 781, 790 (1903).
17 67 Neb. 500 at -, 93 N.W 713 at 714 (1903).
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There seems to have been no case presented in which the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky has been squarely faced with the problem of
whether a riparian proprietor may use water from a stream for irriga-
tion. Since there is some irrigation now and a probability of much
more m the near future, tbis question probably will be presented to
the court. In contemplation of such a case, the problem must be
analyzed under the present Kentucky rule of the natural flow theory
of riparian ownership, and the questions answered whether irrigation
is to be allowed at all, and if so, to what extent. The answer to the
first question is clearly affirmatve, because Kentucky follows "the gen-
eral law regulating the rights of riparian owners",' 8 and the court un-
doubtedly would hold irrigation to be a common law right of the
riparian owner. 19 An answer to the second question requires more
extended discussion.
The law as to the use of water by a riparian proprietor m Kentucky
is best described m two cases: Anderson v Cincinnati Southern Rail-
way,"20 decided in 1887 and City of Louisville v Tway,2' decided m
1944. In the former, the appellant was the owner of a grist-mill on a
small creek and ran it under an order granted by the county court.
Two miles above the complainant's mill the defendant railroad com-
pany constructed a small dam to supply a reservoir for water for their
trains. The dam resulted m failure of the plaintiff to have sufficient
power to run his mill. After deciding the law, the court reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial saying that if the use of the water
by the defendant railroad caused no material injury to the plaintiff,
no recovery could be had, and such question was a question of fact
for the jury to decide. The court said:
"Water may, by a riparian owner, be withdrawn from a stream by
ordinary means, or by artificial channels, for the purpose of supplying
the wants of men and animals, even to the extent of producing a ma-
tenal diminution in the force and volume of the current. But it can
not be withdrawn for the purpose of irrigation, or for any other
secondary and artificial purpose, except in such a reasonable and
legitimate way as not to interfere unjustifiably with its general use.2-
(Italics supplied)
Later in their opinion, the court went on to explam:
"The owner is entitled to the reasonable use of the water for natural
and domestic purposes; but when he undertakes to divert the course
of the stream, or detain the water by means of a dam, so as to prevent
" Inland Steel Co. v. Isaacs, 283 Ky. 770, 143 S.W 2d 503 (1940).
' See note 11 supra.
86 Ky. 44, 5 S.W 49 (1887).
'297 Ky. 565, 180 S.W 2d 278 (1944).
m86 Ky. 44 at 49, 5 S.W at 52 (1887).
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the previous supply to other riparian owners, he becomes a wrong-
doer. The use and detention of the water on a large stream by
means of a dam, for purposes of the railroad, might not be an un-
reasonable use, as ordinarily there would be ample water left for all
the purposes of the riparian owners below; yet, where the stream is
small, or even large, if the dam so obstructs the water as to dimnish
the flow and lessen the capacity of the water power below, it is an
injury to the proprietor for which damages may be awarded. The
question, therefore, m thi case, is not whether the railroad com-
pany made an unreasonable use of the water, but whether its use for
the purposes of the railroad injured the mill below.' (Italics sup-
plied).
The italicized portions of the excerpts are the key phrases to be
interpreted. "Except m such a reasonable and legitimate way as not
to interfere unjustifiably with its general use" would seem to indicate
an application of the reasonable use theory rather than the natural
flow theory However, the later language which states that the "
question is not whether the railroad company made an unreasonable
use of the water, but whether its use for the purposes of the railroad
injured the mill below" points to the natural flow doctrine. But it
would seem to make little difference, especially in the light of what
the court said in the Tway24 case:
"It is true, as suggested by counsel for appellant, that our court is
committed to the natural flow rule though as we read the two rules
(Reasonable Use) the distinction is rather close, and even
under what may be termed the more restricted theory, (natural flow)
each riparian owner is recognized as having a privilege to use the
water to supply his natural wants, and extraordinary or artificial uses,
so that such does not sensibly or materially affect the quantity of the
water and such uses by a lower riparian owner." -
The court cited the rule of the Restatement of Torts as to unreason-
able use and interpreted the Anderson case as applying the same rule.
The Restatement says:
"Before a riparian proprietor is subject to the liability stated in this
Section, his use of the water must be unreasonable in respect to the
riparian proprietor who is banned by it."'"
The court also agreed with the court in the Anderson case on the
point that, "The mere detention of the water is not of itself the injury.
It must be such as affects the lower riparian owner."2 7
It must be concluded from these two cases and the language used
by the court in its opinions that the Kentucky rule lies somewhere be-
2Id. at 5 S.W at 52.
Supra, note 20.
=297 Ky. 656 at 569, 180 S.W 2d 278 at 280 (1944).
4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 357 (1936).
"7297 Ky. 565 at 570, 180 S.W 2d 278 at 280 (1944); 86 Ky. 44 at 53, 5
S.W 49 at 53 (1887).
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tween the natural flow theory and the reasonable use theory It is be-
lieved that Kentucky would not permit as extensive a use of the water
for irrigation in a particular fact situation as would a jurisdiction which
applies the reasonable use theory strictly On the other hand, it might
be said with equal safety that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky would
go further than would a court applying the natural flow theory strictly
Practically speaking, this conclusion is of little aid to the farmer
who wishes to remove water from a stream along his land for irrigation
but fears to do so because of the legal repercussions which may result.
Since a hard and fast rule can not be laid down because of the un-
certainty2  of the Kentucky rule on riparian ownership and doubly so
since Kentucky had no cases upon the specific question, it may be help-
ful to suggest what the court would do if presented with certain simple
fact situations.
First, is the case in which a riparian owner uses water for irrigation
and the use of it does not in any way, or to any material extent, affect
or harm the lower riparian owners, other than to create a negligible
decrease in volume. No suit against the user would be maintainable.
Second, where one uses the water for irrigation to the extent that the
lower riparian owner has only enough water left for his natural wants.
Assuming that no more water than necessary was used in the irrigation
and the lower owner used the water for no other purposes than his
natural and domestic wants, the court probably would hold no cause
of action. Third is the case in which all of the water is used for the
purpose of irrigation. There is little doubt here that the court would
hold that the lower riparian proprietor has a valid cause of action. It
is believed that even if the plaintiff in a case such as this had suffered
no actual damages, other than being deprived of a flowing stream that
he has a cause of action in Kentucky
Finally, a somewhat more complicated fact situation might arise.
Suppose A owns land through which flows a stream. This stream also
flows through the land of B, a lower riparian owner. During the month
of June, every year, this stream goes dry and leaves both A and B with-
out water benefits from the stream. A is a farmer and usually during
June, July, August and September, his crops suffer because of lack of
ram. B is a farmer and cattleman. A builds a small dam2 9 but at all
"The extent of a ripanan owner s right to the use of water for irrigation is
necessarily indefinite, uncertain, and subject to fluctuation, as it must always be
dependent upon future like needs between them and no riparian ownership of a
definite amount of water as against other riparian owners." Little Walla Irr. Umon
v. Firs Irr. Co., 62 Or. 348, 124 P 666 (1912).
' "A riparian owner, in order to make the reasonable use of the water allowed
by law, may, as against a lower proprietor, erect a dam, and thereby detain the
water long enough for its profitable enjoyment, provided the detention is neces-
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times allows an ample supply of water to flow through to B, merely
backs up the water on bis land to have enough to irrigate through the
period of drouth. In June, the lack of sufficient rainfall plus high
temperatures causes the water to stop flowing over the dam and B re-
ceives no more water. B sues A for obstructing the flow of water. If
A defends on the ground that the stream would have been dry had he
not backed up the water, what would be the court ruling m Ken-
tuckyP It is submitted that by applying the reasoning of the Anderson
and Tway cases to this situation, the court would hold that the method
employed by A m holding and using the water was "such a reasonable
and legitimate way as not to interfere unjustifiably with its general
use."30 If the stream would have been dry in any event, then certainly
the use by A was not such that it interfered with or injured the lower
riparian owner.
Under the above analysis the future legal status of irrigation should
be encouraging to the farmer m Kentucky In the absence of previous
litigation it is apparent that future formulation of case law on this
question will be influenced by the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the first case reaching the litigation stage. If such a case
should involve an unusual or extreme use of water over and beyond
those uses pointed out in the hypothetical situations above, the court
probably would disallow the use. There would be a normal reluctance
to alter to any appreciable extent the precedent previously adhered to.
In other words, the natural flow theory would not be extended by in-
terpretation to permit unusual or extreme use of water in irrigation.
There is no reason to suppose that the court would be unwilling to
protect substantial investments m irrigating equipment so long as the
devices and methods used do not contemplate the use of an unusual
amount of water. A decision encouraging potential irrigation would
also encourage land development, an increase in land values, and
diversification of farm crops. This solution of an admittedly difficult
but increasingly important legal problem would have the advantage of
making unnecessary local statutory adoption 3i of any new doctrine
sary and for a proper purpose, and is not unreasonable in iomt of duration. Such
a detention of the water is ordinarily for the purpose of furimshmg power for
industrial purposes. In determining what is a reasonable use of the water for the
purpose of furishing power, as against lower mill owners on the same stream, the
nature of the stream and of the several mill privileges, its adaptability to different
modes of use, the wants of the community, the custom and usage of people in the
neighborhood and elsewhere m regard to the management of business, the hours
of labor and the use of the water of such streams, are all, it has been said, proper
matters for consideration." 3 TIFFANTY, REAL PnoPERT 135 (Sd ed. 1939).
See note 21 supra.
There exists m Kentucky now a means for co-operative group irrgation
under a statute authonzing a so-called "district" plan. Ky. R v. STAT. (1948)
NOTES AND CoIIENTs
of water use, such as the theory of prior appropriation32 prevalent in
Western states.
HuGHi C. EvANs
CREDITORS' RIGHTS: CONVEYANCES IN
FRAUD OF SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS
One of the earliest and most perplexing problems encountered in
the field of jurisprudence was that of aiding creditors in the collection
of their just debts. The axiom that "necessity is the mother of mven-
tion" might here be changed to read, "necessity is the mother of pro-
tection" That debtors early acquired habits and methods of putting
their property beyond the reach of creditors is indicated by the fact
that even the Romans found a need for regulations to prevent such
fraud.i Later, in England, several statutes designed to prevent this
evil were passed.2 The most famous of these was the Statute of 13
Elizabeth, 3 which provided that every conveyance made to the end,
purpose and intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others of
their just and lawful actions would be void.4 At the common law, in
jurisdictions that did not have statutes such as this, only those creditors
whose claims were in existence at the time a conveyance was made
could attack it.5 One whose claim came into existence after the con-
veyance could not complain. Not until the advent of statutes like the
English statute, which included the words "and others," did the courts
bring subsequent creditors within the rule.6 At a glance it is ap-
e. 262. There are of course obvious difficulties for the individual farmer under
tlus method, such as inability to secure the agreement of interest of his neighbors
or the lack of other farmers in the area where he may be, etc.
The doctrine of prior appropriation was adopted by most of the states in
the and and semiarid western states because the common law of riparian rights
was not suited to their region. Under this doctrine the one who first diverts and
applies to a beneficial use the water of a stream has a pnor right to the use therein
to the extent of his appropriation. Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. New Loveland
& Img. & Land Co., 40 Colo. 382, 93 P 485 (1807). For lustoncal explanation
of law of prior appropnation, see In re Hood River, 114 Ore. 112, 227 P. 1065
(1924).
'BucLabND, TBE MAiN INsTiTuTiONs OF ROmmN PRIVATE LAW 339 (1931).
27 Eliz. C. 4 (1585); 3 Henry VII C. 4 (1486); 50 Edw. III C. 6 (1376).
13 Eliz. C. 5 (1570). It has been stated that this statute and those above,
are merely declaratory of the common law. See Springer v. Drosch, 32 Ind. 486
(1870).
'Ibid.
Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Oluo 469 (1842).
1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 554 (rev. ed. 1940); 24 Am. Jun.
164 (1939). The circumstances under which a conveyance can be said to be
fraudulent were first set out in Twyne s Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80 b (1601), which has
been frequently quoted and discussed where the problem of this type of transfer
has arisen.
